Title

Competitive Advantage in Family Business Governance: The Role of Relational Contracting

Authors

Matt Allen

Comments

For inquiries, please contact the Babson Faculty Research Fund.

Abstract

Family business researchers present conflicting viewpoints regarding the performance implications of family business governance. One view takes a “stewardship” perspective arguing that increased interest alignment within family businesses decreases agency issues resulting in lower costs and higher performance. Recent research, however, has demonstrated that while unique, family businesses do experience significant “agency” issues. This manuscript addresses these conflicting views by examining the role of “relational governance” in family businesses. The application of relational governance can both address agency issues, and at the same time, explain the competitive advantage experienced by family businesses in relation to their governance structures.

Academic Division

Entrepreneurship

Disciplines

Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS