We combine insights from multiple agency theory with the resource-based view (RBV) to explain outcomes of financial distress in entrepreneurial buyouts. We examine the effect of 1) PE reputation 2) PE experience 3) PE type 4) PE fundraising efforts 5) board experience and 6) board proximity on the likelihood of a financially distressed buyout ending up in bankruptcy rather than remaining a going concern. We build a unique dataset of 440 distressed buyout transactions, comprising 1287 firm-year observations in the UK during the period 1995 to 2010. We find that the probability of a distressed buyout ending up in bankruptcy reduces when PE firms are raising new funds from limited partners. Distressed buyouts backed by bank-affiliated PEs are also less likely to end up in bankruptcy. Finally, the more insiders on the board and the more experienced the board of directors, the less likely that a buyout will end up in bankruptcy.
Meuleman, Miguel; Wilson, Nick; Wright, Mike; and Neckebrouck, Jeroen
"ENTREPRENEURIAL BUYOUTS AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS: A MULTIPLE AGENCY PERSPECTIVE,"
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research: Vol. 34
, Article 5.
Available at: http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol34/iss2/5