Dasein Lost in Iroquoia


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My project argues 1) that Heidegger's descriptions are skewed and extremely limited and 2) that rather than being the product of a phenomenological bracketing, they are the product of a set of culturally-bound metaphysical assumptions. As a methodology, I deploy a comparative phenomenology by offering the Iroquois as a counter-argument or counter-model, showing that formal practices of relating to dead people, which might appear simply to be funerary practices, can be significant sources for the constitution of specific configurations of subjectivity. Confronting both the implicit universalism and abstract individualism of Heidegger's existential phenomenology, alternative cultural formations provide models of the way that death informs the constitution of forms of life enmeshed in community.


Arts and Humanities | Philosophy

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