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AMERICAN JEWS AND
THE STRUGGLE OVER APARTHEID

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In June 1990, New York City prepared for a triumphant visit by Nelson Mandela, the deputy president of the African National Congress, who had recently been released from his twenty-seven years in prison for working to end the evils of apartheid in his native South Africa. New Yorkers welcomed the hero of human rights and saw his visit as the culmination of decades of global antiapartheid activism that helped to end forty-five years of apartheid rule and more than three hundred years of segregation in South Africa. Movement leaders emphasized that their struggle drew strength from the core American values of dignity, equality, and freedom.1 American Jewish organizations, long active in the movement, wedded these ideals to the Jewish imperative of justice, and they spoke of their activism in language that linked the lessons of the Nazi Holocaust and Black liberation.

Beneath the outward veneer of celebration, however, American Jewish leaders engaged in fierce debates over how to greet Mandela. These debates highlighted longstanding tensions over American Jews’ loyalty to Israel, and, specifically, over Mandela’s relationship with Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Shortly after his release from prison, Mandela was reported to have “embraced” Arafat, explicitly paralleling the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa to Arafat’s struggle against “a unique form of colonialism” in Israel.2 To those who considered Arafat’s struggle as threatening to Israel’s existence, this sounded alarm bells. Large ads funded by Jewish organizations in the New York Times accused “liberal” Jews and non-Jews alike of choosing Mandela over Israel, of prioritizing the liberation campaign for Black South Africa over that of Jews, and even of promoting anti-Semitism.3

This article will review the high stakes of these conflicts over South Africa for American Jews, from the end of the Nazi Holocaust to the present day. As these conflicts played out in the international media and within Jewish organizational meetings, correspondence, and literature, they revealed fundamental disagreements over how to define Jewish interests and values. They also raised questions about what role American Jews should play in the world Jewish community and what causes Jews should ally themselves with as Jews. After World War II, American Jews increasingly saw their own Jewishness fractured through the prism of
international liberation struggles. Following the Civil Rights, Feminist and Gay Rights movements, American Jewish women, in particular, often joined the fight against apartheid, tying their feminist and anti-colonialist positions to their Jewishness. During these same decades, Jewish neoconservatives rose to leadership positions within many American Jewish organizations, using legacies of the Nazi Holocaust to argue for a far more narrow definition of Jewish interests, built around fears of declining religiosity and staunch support of Israel. The stage was set, then, for heated, intra-communal disputes over “Jewish positions” on Civil, Women’s and Gay Rights, and on Israel and South Africa.4

This article, the first to document American Jews’ work to end South African apartheid, will examine how women and men balanced particularist and universalist commitments in Jewish organizations and in nonsectarian organizations that counted Jewish members. Through the analysis of key moments in American Jewish debates over apartheid—debates among themselves and with African American leaders, United Nations officials, and other leaders and laypeople—this study advances scholarly conversations across multiple fields. First, it situates the study of American Jewish history within a global framework that extends beyond examinations of American Jewish responses to the Nazi Holocaust, Israel’s statehood and wars, and campaigns to free Soviet Jewry.5 It builds on Hasia Diner’s pioneering work on American Jews’ commitment to Civil Rights, a study that revealed a broader spectrum of American Jewish political commitments.6 And it follows the lead of Michael Staub’s work in documenting American intra-Jewish debate over the war in Vietnam, when both doves and hawks drew from Holocaust consciousness and prophetic Judaism to support their positions as Jews.7 In line with the internationalization of history, this study explores the diasporic relationships among Jews—in the United States and South Africa—and the interplay of national and religious alliances in the historic struggle against apartheid.8

This work will also address a gap in scholarship of the antiapartheid movement. Policy makers and their students wrote the first studies of the relationship between South Africa and the United States.9 Only recently have scholars begun to examine the role of religious, student, nongovernmental and other organizations in dismantling apartheid.10 This study of Jewish antiapartheid work will join this emerging second wave of historical literature. Adopting its
emphasis on social history, “American Jews and the Struggle Over Apartheid” highlights the role of a particular religious coalition and the difficult course its members had to navigate in order to combat injustice. The experiences of Jewish activists and their opponents reveal the decisive role that religious, ethnic and national identity played in defining citizen movements and the global crises they faced during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

The article begins in the 1950s, when leaders of organizations such as the World Jewish Congress (WJC) sought Jewish unity in response to the Nazi Holocaust. Fearful that American critiques of apartheid would jeopardize WJC efforts to court South African membership, top officials prohibited any public antiapartheid statements. This prompted fierce and long-running arguments with American Jewish liberals, such as Rabbi Joachim Prinz, who had close ties to Civil Rights and anti-colonialist movements. The article then moves forward to analyze the rising temperature of these debates during the 1960s and 1970s. In these years, marked by the rise of both Black Nationalism and conservative Jewish communal leadership, debates raged among African-American and Jewish communities over South Africa’s relationship to Israel. Sharp exchanges over the measure of American Jews’ support for Israelis, Palestinians, and the antiapartheid movement appeared in the *New York Times*, Black nationalist magazines, in the liberal American Committee on Africa, and broadly in African American and Jewish organizational life.

In its final sections, “American Jews and the Struggle Over Apartheid” traces the broad outlines of these debates through the collapse of apartheid, Mandela’s visit to the United States, and into the twenty-first century, as American Jews continue to negotiate particularist and universalist commitments to racial and economic justice. It historicizes recent and controversial invocations of apartheid in policy debates, beginning with the United Nations 2001 World Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa. This was the first such conference to address issues of racism and colonialism in a nation now free from apartheid. An early draft of the Durban Declaration described Israel’s policies in its territories as “a new kind of apartheid,” and though delegates voted the language out of the document, it revived the explosive equation of Zionism with racism and led to the boycotting of the conference by the United States and Israel. Similar currents—fears of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism—led to
the American and Israeli boycott of Durban II, the second World Conference Against Racism in 2009. The article concludes with an analysis of the firestorm that surrounded former President Jimmy Carter’s book, *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid* (2007), when tensions rose, once again, to the boiling point, and individuals’ responses to the book were seen as litmus tests of particularist Jewish loyalties.

Like other peoples, including African Americans and Palestinians around the world, American Jews have felt the pull of their diasporic identity. In their encounters with each other and with these other groups, American Jews have demonstrated a broad array of ways of making sense of that identity. “American Jews and the Struggle Over Apartheid” chronicles the debates behind Jewish contributions to the social movement that ended apartheid, and reveals how a people’s contested loyalties continue to shape its commitments to the principles of liberation. Above all, the complex, intense and enduring nature of the few key historical conflicts discussed herein suggests the need for further study of the history of American Jews and apartheid.

*The Universal and the Particular: Two Organizations and Two Jewish Responses to Civil Rights and Apartheid*

In 1954, American and South African citizens engaged in courageous acts of defiance of white supremacy. As Jewish leaders throughout the Western world struggled to draw lessons from the destruction of the Nazi Holocaust, the racial situations in these two nations came into sharp focus. Jewish citizens of Western nations took positions on South African apartheid using the reference points of American Civil Rights and the Nazi Holocaust. Many of these leaders proclaimed an urgent duty to unify world Jewry, to perpetuate Western Judaism(s) now that its cultural “homeland” in Europe had been viciously destroyed.

But at times, this duty placed Jewish leaders at odds with world organizations who strove to draw universalist lessons from the destruction of both World Wars—organizations like the United Nations, whose members also struggled to balance commitment to individual nations’ sovereignty with a commitment to universal human rights for all world citizens. Jewish leaders’ vision of unified Jewry was at odds, too, with those who felt sincere commitments to
domestic liberation struggles. How should these organizations define what is “best” for world Jewry, and, in their pursuit of unity, how much room could they allow for dissent on national and international issues? The urgent and eloquent language found in correspondence over these issues demonstrates that each side felt the stakes were extraordinarily high.

The founders of United Nations sought to universalize human rights, and created the UN in 1945 to serve as the world’s watchdog. Though the institutions was charged with protecting those rights and the preventing the outbreak of another World War, its authority and influence were unclear. As South African legislators strengthened apartheid laws, and India attempted to place South Africa’s treatment of people of Indian origin on the Assembly’s agenda, the UN began to navigate the boundaries within which it could operate. Was apartheid entirely a domestic issue, or did its injustices merit international concern? Gradually, the UN began to criticize apartheid; unhappy with the pressure placed upon it by the UN, the South African government later chose to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and downgrade its representation at Assembly meetings.

The United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa, founded in December 1950, issued a Resolution urging nongovernmental organizations to “eradicate prejudice and discrimination” and to work with them on “promoting a peaceful settlement.” The World Jewish Congress (WJC), as an NGO, received this resolution. The WJC was founded in 1936 to meet the increasingly urgent need for a unified, representative body to support Jewish interests Europe. In later years, the WJC developed a long and productive history with the United Nations. Its leaders worked with the UN to draft the language of five of the articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These articles dealt with international treatment of national laws that restricted human rights and issues of asylum. “We had learned our lessons from the Nazis,” wrote one WJC leader, after he celebrated the passage of the Declaration in 1948.

But leaders of the World Jewish Congress differed over how to respond to the UN’s 1954 resolution regarding South Africa. South African Jewish leaders continued to debate membership in the World Jewish Congress. How might they best balance the organization’s commitment to Jewish unity with its responsibility to speak out against injustice in an affiliated
nation? Did it, indeed, have that responsibility? Rabbi Maurice Perlzweig, head of the WJC’s New York office, informed the board that it must ignore the UN’s request: though his regret was “deep and genuine,” he saw this as “inevitable in view of our relationship with the South African Board of Deputies.”

David Petegorsky, leader in the American Jewish Congress and an executive board member of the World Jewish Congress since 1948, responded to Perlzweig’s memo with “vigorous protest.” He continued: “The refusal of the WJC to reply to a communication from the Secretary General on one of the worst cases of racial segregation in the world cannot be regarded simply as a matter of expediency. It seems to me to go to the very heart of the principles for which we stand.” Though Petegorsky acknowledged the difficult position of the WJC with regard to the South African Jewish leadership, he insisted that a “dignified reply” could be made without jeopardizing South African’s affiliation. In his final paragraph, Petegorsky inserted a reference to the American Civil Rights movement and to Jewish organizational involvement in a pivotal event within U.S. borders in 1954, the case of Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas:

You may not be aware of the fact that last year, the AJCongress filed a brief amicus in the segregation case before the Supreme Court. A delegation of three Jews from the South came to New York to visit Dr. Goldstein [Israel Goldstein, head of the American Jewish Congress from 1951-1958]...to demand that we withdraw our brief and threatened that it we did not...we would be denied allocations from Welfare Funds in the South. Dr. Goldstein promptly told them that while he had no idea how we would be financially affected, this was to us a matter of basic principle and we could under no circumstances yield to any such demands.

The events of the American Civil Rights Movement drove American Jewish organizations to take a stand on issues of racial justice, and this energy rippled outward with significant international ramifications. In his next correspondence, Petegorsky continued to insist on his own earnestness. He asserted that he was “not insensitive to the peculiar problems which an international organization faces.” But to Petegorsky, Perlzweig’s desire for silence on the issue of South African apartheid rested on only weak evidence. From an organizational standpoint,
Petegorsky noted that the AJCongress’s “actual allocation from the Southern part of the U.S. is far greater than the sum which the South African Board contributes to the WJC.” Thus the risk the AJCongress took in speaking out against American segregation was, by his measure, far greater than the WJC faced, and they were “outspoken” on the issue of Black Americans’ civil rights nevertheless.19

More philosophically, he used the idea of universalism to dispute the leader’s position. What spoke for this new spirit of universalism better than the work of the United Nations, where this heated exchange first began? Arguing that the problem of segregation in South Africa was not a domestic issue, he wrote: “Evidently the United Nations did not think so when it set up its commission.”20

By 1960, as activists on both side of the Atlantic broke apart the idea of a “consensus” on white supremacy, the question of the organization’s “basic principles” and responsibilities concerning South African apartheid remained open. This was the year of the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa, in which government troops shot hundreds of Black South Africans for protesting the pass laws that severely restricted the movement of Blacks in designated “white” areas. It was also the year activists began the sit-in movement at segregated eating establishments in the Southern United States.

Despite the charged and polarizing nature of these events, Perlzeig remained hopeful that a Paris meeting—attended by Western Jewish leaders, including a South African delegation—could reach a working consensus and present a united Jewish front on issues of international concern. For, as he wrote, even apart from the constitutional rules of the WJC, his personal priorities were to respect “the obligations of courtesy and of Jewish solidarity.”21 For Perlzeig, the Holocaust’s lessons lay in a desire for unity; for Petegorsky, too great an insistence on unity threatened to deny Jewish organizations the opportunity to confront racial injustice.

Even as Perlzeig pursued his goal of Jewish solidarity, he acknowledged that that goal had already been defeated in the United States. He held up the South African Board of Jewish Deputies as a “genuinely representative body, including all shades of opinion.” In the United States, by contrast, Jewish organizations compete, and that competition sharpens the distance
between their carefully defined views. “There is something that they do not have to lose, because they do not have it,” Perlzweig wrote, “and that is Jewish unity.” By his own lights, he found it “curious” that some respectable Jewish organizations believe “that Jewish organized unity cannot be achieved, and would in any case be bad and undemocratic.”

Perlzweig’s curiosity arose from essential his belief that Jewish survival depended on unity and carefully maintained consensus. To his mind, democratic, liberal competition in American Jewish organizations only served to fracture American Jewish identity along the lines of politics, religious interpretation and observance. While some Western Jews appreciated this cacophony of views, seeing it as a healthy reflection of American liberalism and democracy, Perlzweig saw it as a threat to Jewish survival, in the U.S. and across the world.

From Perlzeig’s perspective, then, if Americans attended the Paris meeting and spoke out against apartheid, they would endanger South African Jews. Perlzweig considered these Jews to be in a precarious position, with a government comprised of many who actively supported the Nazi cause during the war. And in this, he was not alone: Jewish organizations outside of South Africa depicted its Jews as “victims of rampant anti-Semitism.” Though such reports were “groundless,” according to scholars, they served as useful explanations for the lack of vocal resistance to apartheid on the part of the Jewish Board of Deputies. Ultimately Perlzweig agreed that the organization owed South African Jewish leaders a meeting, at which they could discuss the possibility of making a public anti-apartheid statement. But he feared “an outbreak of competitive righteousness” from the AJCongress, and later admitted that his anxiety over whether the American leaders would break their silence took a toll on his health.

Perlzweig’s trepidation over supporting public anti-apartheid statements on South African Jews and his warnings to world Jewish communities over the loss of unity did not sit well with Rabbi Joachim Prinz. A towering figure among American Jewish religious leaders and also in the Civil Rights movement, Prinz had recently conducted a sit-in at the Woolworth’s on New York’s Fifth Avenue, drawing attention to the practices of racial segregation at its southern stores. Just as British and French Jews have the right to “criticize the United States for its failure to implement the Supreme Court decision on segregation in the public schools,” he reasoned, American Jews can speak out about apartheid. He called it “a matter of deep Jewish
concern,” and cited his own experiences in Germany, when American Jews spoke out about Hitler. “We will not be silent in the face of any injustice that we feel is being committed.”

Despite WJC resistance, AJCongress issued a resolution on apartheid in 1960t the WJC influence was powerful enough, however, to convince Prinz to see “that this should not be communicated to the press.” The AJCongress announced the passage of resolutions, disseminated only internally to AJCongress membership and allies, in the following order: 1) they voiced their support for the sit-in movement, and pledged to call on businesses to end the “undemocratic and outdated” practices of discrimination; 2) they condemned apartheid in South Africa; 3) they urged the U.S. to use its influence to end apartheid in South Africa; and 4) they pledged support for legislation that would end discrimination in the Southern and Northern United States. Perlzweig was pleased not only that Prinz did not leak the anti-apartheid resolution to the press, but also that in his opening remarks he limited himself to talking generally about support for Black Africans.

Generally, Perlzweig explained away the AJCongress position by describing it as rooted in strategic alliances and response to the peculiar strands of American anti-Semitism. Indeed, to South African Jewish leaders, Perlzweig explained the Congress’s outspokenness was a product of its close ties with African American organizations and the fact that “there are places in the American South where active anti-Semitism and resistance to integration are closely tied.”

These heated exchanges over South African membership in the World Jewish Congress have never been made public. The few scholars who mention the ordeal date the conflict to the mid-1960s or 1970s. But Jews’ struggle over apartheid has deeper roots. It began with the early struggles of the UN to define its authority to protect universal human rights. And it deepened as the American Civil Rights Movement grew in strength and the passage of harsh apartheid laws sparked greater conflict. These events are crucial to understanding the shifting relationship among African Americans and Jews in this period; they are also crucial to understanding the evolving nature of American Jewish commitments to unity and universalism, to liberation struggles and to their own particularist agendas in the decades following World War II and the Nazi Holocaust.
Fritz Flesch: The Nazi Holocaust and Apartheid: Cui Bono?

Few examples present so clear and decisive a connection between the Holocaust and Jewish attitudes to apartheid as Fritz Flesch. Flesch was a union activist in Detroit and a Holocaust survivor. In the 1950s, he began collecting material about Jews—mainly from South Africa and the United States—and their response to South African apartheid. His collecting was clearly obsessive—he cut out articles from presses across the world, taped them together and made multiple copies. We know this because by the 1950s, he began distributing these materials to political figures such as Senator Jacob Javits and former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, as well as Jewish leaders across the political spectrum and across the world.

Flesch wrote that the “TOP REPRESENTATIVES of Judaism in South Africa...act like ‘gleichgeschaltete’ ‘German Christians’ under Hitler.” He blasted Jewish leadership in South Africa for not cooperating with United Nations investigations, and Jewish leadership outside of South Africa for backing South Africa in those efforts. He was angry, he wrote, at the “silence of the world.”

Though scholars dismiss his actions because of his obsessive tendencies, Flesch triangulated Civil Rights, the Nazi Holocaust, and South African apartheid in compelling ways. On most materials he distributed, he handwrote the words “Cui bono?” which translates as “to whose benefit?” Citing his experiences at Dachau in the late 1930s, Flesch demanded accountability for a system he saw as analogous to Nazism.

Some recipients of his clippings felt he deserved a response. In 1958, Eleanor Roosevelt gave her letter to the American Zionist leader Israel Goldstein. Goldstein laced his reply to Flesch with references to prophetic Judaism’s imperative to dismantle white supremacy, in the United States and South Africa. “No doubt there are Jews in South Africa,” he wrote, “just as there are some Jews in our own Southern States, who take an attitude which we think to be wrong and utterly incompatible with the teachings of Judaism.” He noted the many South African rabbis who “with great courage,” work to resist the policies of the apartheid regime. And of his own credentials, and those of American Jews overall, Goldstein claimed that American Jews were the “principal supporters” in the struggle for “full emancipation and equality.”
Though Flesch did not play a leading role in the American debates over South African apartheid, he filled the mailboxes of several leaders with documentation of Jewish responses to apartheid. His letters can be found in the files of the American Committee on Africa, and the Reform Movement of American Judaism’s Religious Action Committee. Because he was a union activist, these documentations of Jewish responses to apartheid sit too in the Union Reuther archive in Detroit, Michigan. Flesch offered these documents to inspire reflection, redemption, and action. Spread across the United States, they offer an important reminder – for those who were willing to examine them – of the deep, historic connections between American Civil Rights, the Nazi Holocaust, and South African apartheid.

*Israel and Africa, Zionism and Black Nationalism*

On June 28, 1970, a full page advertisement in the *New York Times* sparked tremendous controversy among and between African Americans and American Jews. Entitled “An Appeal by Black Americans for United States Support to Israel,” the ad listed the signatures of seventy African Americans who called for American support for Israel—specifically in the form of military jets. The signers included leaders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Urban League, Congressional and other political leaders. Bayard Rustin, Civil Rights leader and later the organizer of the 1963 March on Washington, initiated the advertisement, describing it as of “extraordinary moral and political significance.” Citing Jewish support for the recent African American nominee for Lieutenant Governor of New York State, Rustin asserted that “the traditional Negro-Jewish alliance for social justice still prevails.” “Blacks should support Israel’s right to exist for the same reasons that they have struggled for freedom and equality in this country.”

But while Rustin and his allies saw the appeal as a moral act, respecting a longstanding alliance by supporting a Jewish liberation movement in Zionism, Black Nationalists in the United States expressed their anger at what some called “an unforgivable act of treason against our people.” Calling the signers opportunistic, a leader of the Pan African Congress from Michigan responded to the ad in the pages of the *Liberator* magazine: “Any Black man anywhere in the world who advocates the support of Israel is advocating support for the enemies of all African
people.” He drew parallels among Israel, the United States and South Africa, as each one was an “artificial white settler state.” Above all, he claimed solidarity with Arab peoples, displaced from Israel, as with Africans, displaced and “enslaved” in South Africa.36

Frustrated with the pace of change in the American Civil Rights movement, distressed at the alliances between Israel and South Africa, some African Americans outside of the Black Nationalist organizations sympathized with these perspectives. One of them was Charles Hightower, of the American Committee on Africa. The ACOA was founded in 1953 to support liberation struggles in Africa, and Hightower caused a crisis in his organization when he sent a letter – on ACOA letterhead – to some of the signers of the appeal for Israel, criticizing their actions. Some of the ACOA board members objected to Hightower’s stand and insisted that he write to each recipient of his letter, clarifying that he spoke for himself and not for the organization. But ultimately ACOA leadership acknowledged that conditions in Israel and South Africa had severely strained older Black-Jewish alliances.

The board called a special meeting to discuss the topic and Richard P. Stevens of Lincoln University, who wrote about Israel and Zionism, expressed these new realities in a thoughtful letter to the staff and board of the ACOA. “I find it personally incredible that it should appear in June 1970 that the concern of Black American ‘leadership’ should be Israel and not Africa,” he wrote, “Could we expect the Zionist organization of America to take out an advertisement condemning Britain for arming South Africa? If so, then Black Americas might have adequate reason to support Zionism; if not, should the concern of Blacks move in support of Israel? Young militants are asking these questions.” For Stevens had detected a “generational and ideological gap” between leaders and “the younger element”: “Among younger Blacks, the inclination is to view their struggle more in terms of ‘liberation’ and ‘Third World’ identification is more pronounced.”37

Several large American and global Jewish organizations had, by the 1960s, passed resolutions against South African apartheid—the World Union for Progressive Judaism in 1960, and the American Jewish Congress in 1964. American Jews followed the leadership of African Americans in the Civil Rights movement in these same years. Still, Stevens’ observations spoke
to a growing rift between African Americans and Jews, as political sympathies diverged and leaders prioritized new agendas.

Into the 21st Century: American Jews and the Limits to Antiapartheid Activism

Despite the widening rifts of the 1970s, American Jews continued to talk of a vibrant Black-Jewish alliance, and they saw their work against apartheid as an extension of the Civil Rights activism that had fostered this alliance. Indeed, anti-apartheid work in American Jewish institutions and organization was widespread, even mainstream, by the mid-1980s. On Christmas 1984, members of the New Jewish Agenda and the American Jewish Committee took over the protests outside of the South African embassy in Washington, D.C. The protests, organized by TransAfrica, lasted two years, prompted 6,000 arrests (many of them of high-profile political figures and film stars), and are credited with giving the antiapartheid movement tremendous visibility. On that Christmas Day, the Jewish protestors linked their Jewishness—customs, values, and history—to the struggle against apartheid. They lit menorahs, and spoke of how the Hanukah holiday recalls “a distant time...when freedom and independence were victorious over oppression.” Above all, the Jewish organizational leaders wanted to remind African Americans that Jews “are indeed close allies in the struggle for human freedom and social justice everywhere.”

American Jewish organizations followed through on this commitment in mobilizing public opinion against apartheid and lobbying for the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which called for economic sanctions against South Africa. Nearly every major Jewish organization issued statements in support of this legislation and of sanctions and divestment overall, including the Jewish Labor Committee, the National Council of Jewish Women, the American Jewish Committee, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, and scores of smaller Jewish organizations in cities across the United States. In those same years, one denomination of the American Jewish religious community, the Reform Movement, even published a guide entitled Ending Apartheid: A Manual for Individual and Congregational Use.
But just as certain brands of Zionism and certain positions on Israel threatened the Black/Jewish coalition with regard to American Black Nationalists and their alliances with “third world” liberation struggles, so too did they threaten the alliances of liberal Jews with the antiapartheid movement. No event made that more clear than the one narrated in this article’s introduction: the visit of Nelson Mandela to New York in 1990.

That narrative begins in South Africa, as Jews around the world expressed shock and dismay over Mandela’s embrace of Yasir Arafat, seen by some Western Jews as an enemy of the Jewish people. Before Nelson Mandela departed for his tour of Europe and the United States, he agreed to meet with the South African Jewish Board of Deputies. Members of this board reassured American Jewish leaders that Mandela remained committed “to the well being of the South African Jewish community and his unswerving opposition to racism and anti-Semitism” and to Israel’s right to exist in “secure borders”; he had also “expressed appreciation for the role Jews had played in the struggle against apartheid.” South African Board members relayed this information to leaders of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC), the umbrella organization of American Jewish institutions, who then worked with African American leaders and members of Congress to plan a meeting with Mandela prior to his stop in the United States. On June 10, 1990, Mandela met with six American Jewish organizational leaders for two hours in Geneva. At the meeting, Jewish leaders and Mandela spoke about their positions with regard to the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The leaders felt that both sides clarified their attitudes, and that subsequently “the American Jewish community could fully and actively participate in the welcome of Mr. Mandela to the United States.”

But for whom did these Jewish leaders speak in their meeting with Mandela, and which American Jews looked for their permission? One vocal critic of mainstream Jewish leaders urged them not to “test Mandela on Israel,” citing a poll that indicated that a majority of American Jews supported Israel’s territorial concessions for peace with Palestinians. Because “supporting Palestinian rights and supporting Israel are not mutually exclusive,” the activist wrote, “the mainstream Jewish leaders misrepresent the people for whom they claim to speak.”
As this exchange made clear, leadership in American Jewish organizations had become increasingly conservative since the late 1960s. These leaders focused more on internal issues, such as rising intermarriage rates and declining religious observance, and less on communal issues of social justice alliances and campaigns. They also endorsed a politically conservative brand of Zionism that muted any criticism of the right wing of Israeli politics and disregarded any claims of human rights abuses on the part of Palestinians living in the occupied territories. Evidence of these developments abound. Into the early 2000s, many American rabbis, especially Orthodox rabbis, built very visible alliances with Far Right evangelical Christian politicians to help promote Israel’s “security.” Stand For Israel, an organization founded by Rabbi Yechiel Eckstein along with Ralph Reed, earned praise from Reverend Jerry Falwell and Senator Joseph Lieberman for its work bringing together evangelical Christians and Jews to raise money for Israel; the Jewish group Toward Tradition, founded by Rabbi Daniel Lapin, also courts political influence as it tries to push American Jewish public opinion toward conservative stands on Israel and on domestic issues.45

Even within the Conservative Movement of American Judaism, which often adopted a more liberal stance toward the interpretation of both Jewish law and public policy issues, members wrestled with right-wing positions on Israel. At their Rabbinical Assembly meeting in Washington D.C. in 2001, Conservative rabbis in the Assembly wrote a resolution condemning Rabbis for Human Rights (RHR). RHR is an organization of Israeli rabbis, long supported by many American rabbis, who cite Jewish teachings as the framework and inspiration for their work on behalf of Palestinians: they have dismantled roadblocks in the Territories, planted trees after the razing of Palestinians’ homes, and likened the Occupation to apartheid. The resolution urged members of the Rabbinical Assembly to refrain from affiliating with Rabbis for Human Rights, and also attempted to overturn the Assembly’s initial endorsement of the group, which dated back to the first Intifada in 1989.

Though the resolution was tabled, the debate surrounding the activism of Rabbis for Human Rights is instructive. One rabbi linked the Holocaust and contemporary anti-Semitism to a conservative political stance with respect to Israel. He wrote that RHR had “not yet awakened to the reality brought home in apocalyptic terms by the Holocaust” because it did
not support Israel’s sovereignty; he also suggested that the organization strive to “actualize the Jewish tradition of human rights”—that it should “change its name” until it adopted “a more unequivocally Jewish agenda.”⁴⁶ On the other side of this debate, a rabbi wrote that the Rabbinical Assembly’s resolution to bar members from supporting Rabbis for Human Rights “resurrected the ghost of McCarthyism.”⁴⁷ The idea that any support of Palestinians was not an authentic Jewish position, that any critique of Israel was equal to outright anti-Semitism: conservative American Jewish leaders grew more vocal with these assertions in the twenty-first century.

The World Conference Against Racism at Durban that took place in 2001 was, in part, undone by these very ideas. Activists had hailed the event as an unprecedented opportunity for the world community to discuss legacies of colonialism and longstanding problems, such as xenophobia and racism. Not at the conference itself, but at a parallel NGO conference, several nations issued a declaration equating Israel’s policies in the occupied territories with apartheid. Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, refused to endorse it or bring it to the main forum. Yet Israelis and Americans walked out in protest, and the two forums merged in people’s minds into one pernicious, anti-Semitic gathering. An article in The Economist recorded the following observation: “The whole thing was ‘a festival of hate and anti-Semitism’ said Hillel Neuer, head of UN Watch, a group that monitors the world body for perceived bias against Jews and anti-Semitism.”⁴⁸

The follow-up conference to Durban I, called “Durban II” and held in Geneva in April 2009, was to measure the progress toward the goals set at Durban. The United States decided to boycott the conference altogether, again citing concerns that it could be used as a forum for anti-Semitism. Specifically, Jewish groups expressed their disappointment that Iran and Libya were appointed to the conference planning committee.

The World Jewish Congress, meeting in Jerusalem four months before the conference, issued a resolution that indicated members’ fears of “the high possibility that Durban II will constitute an unwarranted and illegitimate attack on democratic freedoms, international human rights law, and an attack on Israel, not only through a series of one-sided and inaccurate resolutions, but also by ignoring the worst forms of racism that continue in a number of parts of
the world.” They acknowledged that “some governments played a constructive, vital and courageous role at Durban,” but lamented that they were “unable to prevent abuses of process.” Switching entirely to the future tense, the group outlined their anxieties further: “[the WJC members] STRONGLY BELIEVE that the ‘red lines’, which: single out or demonise any one State; introduce the policy of opposing defamation of religion; delete condemnation of anti-Semitism; remove calls for Holocaust commemoration; or construct a hierarchy of racisms, will be crossed at the Durban II Conference.” The Resolution concluded with the following statement: “[The World Jewish Congress] ACCORDINGLY NOW REQUESTS JEWISH COMMUNITIES WORLDWIDE TO FORTHWITH CALL UPON THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS TO IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW FROM THE DURBAN REVIEW PROCESS AND NOT ATTEND THE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN APRIL 2009” (emphasis in the original).49

Since 1950, WJC leaders have struggled to maintain Jewish unity, a particularist priority, in the face of broad, universalist struggles for liberation. Immediately after World War II, the WJC cooperated with the UN, consistently referring to the need for human rights laws in the wake of Jewish genocide. Yet measuring Jewish loyalty and history against commitments to other sites of modern injustice proved difficult. As Durban I and II made clear, despite the WJC’s central role in crafting the UN Declaration of Human Rights, it now felt the cost of engaging the outside world was too high, and it withdrew from these struggles.

Many world leaders expressed regret that this conference, like its predecessor, would prove to be a missed opportunity to talk about central human rights issues. “I am shocked and deeply disappointed by the United States decision not to attend a conference that aims to combat racism, xenophobia, racial discrimination and other forms of intolerance worldwide,” said Navi Pillay, then the new UN high commissioner for human rights and a native of South Africa. “A handful of states have permitted one or two issues to dominate their approach to this (anti-racism) issue, allowing them to outweigh the concerns of numerous groups of people that suffer racism and similar forms of intolerance to a pernicious and life-damaging degree on a daily basis all across the world.”50

The boycott, which was joined by Australia, the Netherlands, Israel, and Canada, pleased Jewish groups. They attended the review conference in large numbers, ready to “fight the good
fight,” according to one NGO monitor leader.\textsuperscript{51} Indeed, the World Jewish Congress hosted a parallel meeting of the International Jewish Caucus, including representatives from the following groups: Anti-Defamation League; Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council; B’nai B’rith International; CEJI: A Jewish Contribution To An Inclusive Europe; Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations; European Jewish Congress; European Union of Jewish Students; Jewish Human Rights Coalition (UK); NGO Monitor; Simon Wiesenthal Center; South African Jewish Board of Deputies; Women's International Zionist Organization; World Jewish Congress; and World Union of Jewish Students.\textsuperscript{52} Not to look outward, as in the mid-twentieth century, to build alliances toward a broad agenda, but to look inward to a particular Jewish agenda: these groups gathered to make their presence known, and to encourage the world community to reflect on what they perceived as an unfair portrait of Zionism and Israel.

Back in the United States, a similarly furious controversy continued over the publication of former President Jimmy Carter’s 2007 book, \textit{Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid}. Many American Jews loudly and publicly criticized Carter’s analogy of Israel’s policies toward Palestinians with apartheid South Africa—and even accused him of being anti-Semitic. Brandeis University, which is nonsectarian but has strong ties to the Jewish community since its founding by American Jews in 1948, invited Carter to speak about the controversy surrounding his book. The invitation sparked vociferous debate, and for a time Brandeis considered revoking his invitation.\textsuperscript{53} Carter explained his use of the term “apartheid,” citing the fact that Israel had set aside highways for Israelis only, and noting too that liberal Israelis, “from newspaper journalists to professors to peace activists, also refer to Israeli policy on the West Bank as apartheid.”\textsuperscript{54} Carter received a warm welcome at the school, and felt pleased that he had a forum to talk about the attacks on his character. Immediately following his talk, Alan Dershowitz, Harvard law professor and vocal Jewish conservative leader, spoke in the same auditorium. Dershowitz referred to the “two Jimmy Carters”: “the Brandeis Jimmy Carter,” who was “terrific,” and the “Al Jazeera Jimmy Carter,” who presents “a very different perspective.”\textsuperscript{55}

Scores of Jewish organizations continued to blast Carter for his criticism of Israel. Leaders of the (American) Anti-Defamation League penned an open letter to Carter in which they wrote: “True sensitivity to Israel and American Jews would be demonstrated by ceasing
these one-sided attacks and apologizing for damaging the good name of the State of Israel and the Jewish people." Yet Carter is not the only one making comparisons between South African apartheid and Israel’s rule over its occupied territories. Others are making that parallel as a means to build a movement of protest against Israel’s treatment of Palestinians; and they seek to model their work on the successful divestment campaigns of the antiapartheid movement. In 2005, 170 Palestinian organizations issued a call for a Global BDS Movement—boycott, divestment, and sanctions—for Israel. The mission of the BDS movement is “[t]o strengthen and spread the culture of Boycott as a central form of civil resistance to Israeli occupation and apartheid.”

Addressing the claim that “Israel is not South Africa,” activist, journalist and author Naomi Klein, who supports the BDS movement, writes the following:

Of course it isn’t. The relevance of the South African model is that it proves that BDS tactics can be effective when weaker measures (protests, petitions, back-room lobbying) have failed. And there are indeed deeply distressing echoes of South African apartheid in the occupied territories: the color-coded IDs and travel permits, the bulldozed homes and forced displacement, the settler-only roads. Ronnie Kasrils, a prominent South African politician, said that the architecture of segregation that he saw in the West Bank and Gaza was "infinitely worse than apartheid." That was in 2007, before Israel began its full-scale war against the open-air prison that is Gaza.

Few Jewish communities, however, have joined the BDS movement. Naomi Klein, who is Jewish, works outside of these communities in global networks of left activists and scholars. The conservative turn in Jewish leadership means that few congregations take on modern-day justice campaigns, whether in Israel or elsewhere around the world, as they did with antiapartheid activism twenty-five years ago.

**Coda: JFREJ and Jewish Universalism**

Since the 1960s, the links between Jewish activism and pursuits of social justice have become more and more rare, the organizations increasingly hard to find. Yet there is one
organization in Manhattan, founded during Mandela’s 1990 visit to New York. That moment meant that many American Jews celebrated their own particularist expression of universalist values—Jewish expressions of anti-racism and of liberation. In New York City, a group of Jews who had long been active in domestic liberation campaigns prepared for Mandela’s visit by raising money for the African National Congress—and then gave permanence to their collaboration by forming Jews for Racial and Economic Justice (JFREJ). This organization continues to work on campaigns for the rights of immigrants, workers, and the poor in New York City. It is a living example of the balancing of particularist commitments to Jewish history and culture and universalist commitments to social justice and liberation.

In July 2009, the news at JFREJ was that they had hired a new executive director named Joshua Nessen. Nessen began his activist career in the American Committee on Africa, publicizing human rights in southern Africa and working for local, state, and national divestment campaigns targeting U.S. corporations in South Africa and Namibia. Looking forward to new, universalist campaigns for the Jewish community members of JFREJ, the organization draws from the past of the social movement that ended apartheid in South Africa. While the many mainstream Jewish organizations with large memberships focus their energies on protests such as that at Durban II, JFREJ remains outside that mainstream. Though the legacies of the Civil Rights and antiapartheid campaigns continue to inform Jewish approaches to the principles of liberation, the extent to which American Jews will commit themselves to these campaigns remains to be seen.

NOTES
2 On July 31, 1990, leaders of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRA), an umbrella organization for most mainstream Jewish organizations, issued a memo to all of its member agencies which summarized the response of these organizations to Mandela’s relationship to Yasir Arafat and his sentiments toward Israel and American Jews. Reform Action Committee Papers, American Jewish Archive (AJA), Cincinnati, OH.
3 See, for example, “The ‘Bashing’ of Israel,” New York Times (June 12, 1990), B3.
4 Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Friedman devotes a small amount of space to conservative leadership
within Jewish organizations. Several prominent American Jewish historians have challenged some of the points of Murray’s posthumously published book. See, for example, Gerald Sorin, Review, Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution, The American Historical Review 111: 4 (October 2006). Michael Staub concludes his book, Tom at the Roots, with an analysis of the intense conservative criticism of Breira, a left-leaning American organization founded in the 1970s as an “alternative” (the translation of the Hebrew word) to right-wing positions on Israel. Staub remains the singular study of the rise of this conservatism in American Jewish organizations.


Rafael Medoff, Jewish Americans and Political Participation (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC/CLIO, 2002).


See, for example, the correspondence between Maurice Perlzweig, World Jewish Congress, and Joachim Prinz, on the boards of the American Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress, in Spring 1960, in the papers of the World Jewish Congress and Joachim Prinz, both at the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, OH.

Michael Melchior, “Zionism, Racism, and the distortions of the Durban conference,” Midstream Magazine (47: 6) September 1, 2001, 4-7; Naomi Klein writes that the anti-Israel language had “no chance of making it into the final draft” of the conference resolution and that the clauses “gave the U.S. government the perfect excuse to flee the scene,” to avoid the contentious issues of reparations raised by the conference. See Klein, “Minority Death Match: Jews, Blacks, and the ‘Post-racial’ Presidency,” Harper’s Magazine September 2009, 59.

Ruth Wedgwood, “Zionism and Racism Again: Durban II,” World Affairs 171: 4 (Spring 2009), 84-88. Several other Western nations boycotted the conference as well.


Perlzweig MEMORANDUM, 17 March 1954, WJC Papers, AJA.

Petegorsky to Perlzweig, 17 March 1954, WJC Papers AJA.

Petegorsky to Perlzweig, 23 March 1954, WJC Papers, AJA.

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Perlzweig to Maslow, 13 May 1960, WJC Papers, AJA.

Perlzweig to Baron?Saron, South African Jewish Board of Deputies, 16 May 1960, WJC Papers, AJA.

Perlzweig to Turkow, 10 May 1960, WJC Papers, AJA.
25 Shimoni, 149.
26 Perlzweig to Easterman, 16 May 1960, WJC Papers, AJA; Perlzweig to Easterman, 26 May 1960, WJC Papers, AJA.
29 Perlzweig to Saron, 16 May 1960, WJC Papers, AJA.
30 See, for example, Riegner, 428-429; Shimoni, 115.
31 Flesch to Jacob Javits, US Senator, 4 February 1958, American Committee on Africa Papers,
32 See Shimoni, 114.
33 Israel Goldstein to Mr. Fritz Flesch, 16 January 1958,
37 Richard P. Stevens to the Staff and Board of the American Committee on Africa, September 27, 1970, American Committee on Africa Papers, Part I, Reel 3.
40 These are documented in a memo of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council entitled “NJCRAC Member Agency Activity on Apartheid,” authored by Marlene Provizer, Assistant Director, and sent to their Member Agencies on October 31, 1985. Papers of the Religious Action Committee, AJA.
41 Rita Kaunitz published this guide on February 26, 1987, through the Commission on Social Action of the Central Conference of American Rabbis and the UAHC, Reform Action Committee of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations Files, American Jewish Archive, Cincinnati, OH.
42 Herbert Wander, Co Chair, Ad Hoc Committee on Apartheid, and Diana Aviv, Assistant Director, to NJCRAC and CJF Member Agencies, July 31, 1990, Religious Action Committee Papers, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio.
50 www.chinawiew.cn, April 20, 2009; Navi Pillay, “UN Must Act on Racism,” guardian.co.uk, 20 April 2009;


Powell, “Jimmy Carter’s ‘Peace Mission.””

Belluck, “At Brandeis.”


