A number of big corporations have strategized to establish de facto standards using CVC investments (Keil, 2000). Through CVC investments in technological startups, the large player may construct an ecosystem which provides compatibility across products within the system and thus supplies significant network externality (Besen & Farrell, 1994). However, in the standard-setting process, it is uncertain which one of the competing technologies will become the dominant standard. To avoid being technologically locked out (Schilling 1998), startups may conduct some agency behaviors, for example, developing products on competing technologies after receiving CVC investments. Thus, the research question in the study is what factors may predict portfolio companies’ agency behaviors in a standard-setting process through CVC investments? We hypothesize that market dominance has a negative relationship with the occurrence of portfolio company’s agency behaviors. In addition, corporate investors may employ several mechanisms to further control agency behaviors including additional financial investments, intensive technological supports, and board representation in their portfolio companies.