Obtaining and developing resources is central to the success and survival of young firms. One avenue for procuring resources in young firms is through interorganizational relationships with established firms (e.g., Katila et al., 2008; Stuart et al., 1999). For example, firms may seek funding from corporate venture capital (CVC) firms to procure financial resources, gain legitimacy, or gain access to complementary resources that may be difficult or time consuming to develop internally (Gans and Stern, 2003; Katila et al., 2008; Stuart et al., 1999). Interestingly, though, much research from the perspective of the investing firms, the CVCs, suggests that their investments are most effective when the associated motives are strategic in nature, rather than purely financial (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006). This begs the question of, if the CVC firm benefits the most from having strategic motives associated with the start-ups it invests in, what does this mean to the start-up firm? In this study, we address this question. Specifically, we examine start-ups’ performance in the IPO market. Our main premise is that CVC investments create information asymmetries because the average investor does not have enough information with which to evaluate the relationship between the CVC and the start-ups it invests in.