Venture Capitalists (VCs) are an important cog in the wheel of entrepreneurship as they strive to ensure that capital is put to its first and best use. In this regard, researchers continue to develop a deeper understanding of how VCs evaluate the potential of investment opportunities (e.g., Petty & Gruber, 2011). However, a number of important aspects of VC decision-making remain understudied (Payne et al., 2009). One area that has received limited attention is the role of VC control. Specifically, prior research indicates that VCs are heavily involved in the ventures they invest in and thus closely consider the degree to which they will be able to control the entrepreneur (Cable & Shane, 1997) - yet most founding entrepreneurs have a proclivity to resist such control (Wasserman, 2008). Given these competing interests, we draw on agency and configurations theories to model the effects of perceived control, alongside the prestige of the entrepreneur and attractiveness of the opportunity, to determine the direct effect of control and the combination of factors that maximize the likelihood of VC investment.