A large body of literature in entrepreneurship has investigated the antecedents of short-term and long-term performance of newly listed IPO firms (e.g., Gulati & Higgins, 2003). One stream of research within this broad literature is concerned with the characteristics of board of directors (e.g., Certo et al., 2007). This study intends to contribute to this stream of research by investigating the role of finance committees on the short-, medium-, and long-term IPO performance. Specifically, we ground our arguments in resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) to compare the short-, medium-, and long-term performance of newly listed IPO firms that have a finance committee with those that do not have one. Examining this research question is important because while several studies have enhanced our understanding of board-level antecedents of IPO performance (e.g., Kroll et al., 2007), little – if any – attention has been given to the role of board committees in entrepreneurship research. We believe that this is an important omission in the extant literature, since empirical (e.g., Laux & Laux, 2009) as well as anecdotal evidence (e.g., Carter & Lorsch, 2004) suggests that boards mainly function through committees.
"FINANCE COMMITTEES AND SHORT-, MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM IPO PERFORMANCE FIRMS (SUMMARY),"
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research: Vol. 35
, Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol35/iss8/9